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INTRODUCTION
In scholarly discourse about rights, it is often assumed that
democracy is bad for rights. Rights protect individuals.
Democratically enacted laws reflect the will of the majority. The
“tyranny of the majority,” as John Stuart Mill warned long ago,
threatens the rights of individuals.1
It is not necessarily so. There are important examples in
recent US history where majoritarian democracy produced
legislation strengthening protection for individual rights. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,3 the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,4 and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 19935 are just a few examples of
rights-enhancing federal legislation supported by broad-based
democratic majorities.6 Of course, in the past two decades
Congress also enacted important legislation, such as the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19967 and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,8 that restricted protection
of individual rights.
Even so, this Article contends that: (1) the time is ripe for
federal legislation to facilitate domestic judicial application of
international human rights treaty obligations; and (2) such
legislation would yield substantial domestic and foreign policy
1. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 62–63 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1974) (1859).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)).
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006)).
5. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)). The Supreme Court invalidated
the statute in part in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–36 (1997), but the statute
remains in force insofar as it applies to the federal government.
6. See infra notes 171–74 (providing data on bipartisan support for the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990).
7. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (2006))
8. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66
(1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006)).
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benefits for the United States. The first claim may seem
shocking, even preposterous. In the 2010 elections, Republicans
scored one of the biggest electoral landslides in the past
century.9 Moreover, Republican lawmakers are generally hostile
to the domestic judicial application of international human
rights law, as evidenced by recent legislative efforts at both the
state10 and federal11 level to bar judicial reliance on international
law to resolve domestic controversies.
Granted, the current Republican-controlled House of
Representatives is unlikely to support legislation promoting
domestic judicial application of international human rights
treaties. Nevertheless, two points merit emphasis. First, electoral
majorities can change very quickly.12 Hence, within the next few
years, Democrats could possibly control the House, the Senate,
and the Presidency, as they did in the 111th Congress (2009–
10).13 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the composition
of the federal judiciary changes much more slowly than the
composition of Congress. At present, a majority of federal
judges have ideological predilections making them unreceptive
to claims for vigorous domestic judicial enforcement of
international human rights norms.14 Hence, if the United States
is going to take positive steps toward greater judicial protection
9. See Chris Cillizza, Election 2010: Republicans Net 60 House Seats, 6 Senate Seats and
7 Governorships, WASH. POST THE FIX BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010, 8:24 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix/morning-fix/2010-election-republicanscore.html (“Historically, the Republican gains mark the biggest midterm election seat
swap since 1938 when Democrats lost 71 House seats. It has already eclipsed the 1994
Republican tidal wave in which the GOP netted 52 seats.”).
10. See Aaron Fellmeth, International Law and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State
Legislatures, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/
insight110526.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Constitution Restoration Act, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005); see also
Mark Tushnet, The “Constitution Restoration Act” and Judicial Independence: Some
Observations, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1071 (2006) (discussing proposed federal
legislation).
12. See infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text (supporting this claim).
13. In the 2008 elections, Democrats gained a 261–174 majority in the House,
and a 57–2–41 majority in the Senate, with the two independents caucusing with the
Democrats. See JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40086, MEMBERSHIP OF
THE 111TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2010).
14. See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text (stating that the majority of
judges on the US Courts of Appeals were appointed by Republicans and that the
median federal appellate judge is moderately conservative according to empirical
studies).
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of international human rights within the next decade, the
impetus is likely to come from legislation, not litigation.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I
shows that current US practice falls short of international
human rights standards. Over the past decade, the United States
has violated several distinct human rights treaty provisions.
However, it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in a
comprehensive analysis of US compliance with its human rights
treaty obligations. Instead, Part I focuses on three specific issues:
life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders; felon
disenfranchisement laws; and prison conditions in maximum
security prisons.
Part II explains why the United States should comply with
its international human rights treaty commitments. First, in
areas where US policies and practices have strayed from core
American values, domestic implementation of international
human rights law would help align domestic policies with those
core values. Second, the US failure to comply with its human
rights treaty obligations has significant diplomatic and foreign
policy costs.
Part III considers different possible pathways to achieve US
compliance with its human rights treaty obligations. The analysis
suggests that state governments, the federal executive, and the
federal judiciary—acting separately or in combination—are
unlikely to adopt the measures needed to achieve US
compliance with its human rights treaty obligations.
Accordingly, federal legislation is necessary. Part III contends
that Congress should enact federal legislation to expand the
availability of judicial remedies for international human rights
treaty violations in the United States. The Appendix includes
draft legislation to this effect.
Before proceeding further, one caveat is necessary. US
policies in the War on Terror have been the target of intense
criticism. Many critics allege that specific US counterterrorism
measures violate US treaty obligations under human rights
and/or humanitarian law treaties.15 Although I am sympathetic

15. The literature in this area is quite extensive. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt &
Andrea W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military Commissions in Light of
Common Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 L. & INEQUALITY 353 (2008); Leila

2012]

LEGISLATING HUMAN RIGHTS

449

to those criticisms, the focus of this Article is different. I hope to
persuade the reader that a variety of US policies and practices
unrelated to the War on Terror are inconsistent with the
nation’s human rights treaty obligations and that there are
sound reasons to adopt legislation to enhance compliance with
those treaty obligations. The draft legislation in the Appendix
specifically exempts issues related to the War on Terror, in part
because those issues are already the subject of legislative debate.
In contrast, for the past decade or more, Congress has devoted
scant attention to the types of human rights violations that are
the primary subject of this Article.
I. US NONCOMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
OBLIGATIONS
The United States ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)16 in 1992, followed by the
Convention against Racial Discrimination17 and the Convention
against Torture18 in 1994. When it ratified these treaties, the
United States adopted reservations and understandings
(“RUDs”) to limit the scope of its treaty obligations. One key
goal of the RUDs was to ensure that the United States could
achieve compliance with its treaty obligations simply by
implementing pre-existing statutory and constitutional law.
Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton assured the
Senate that the United States could comply fully with its treaty
obligations—as modified by the RUDs—without having to make

Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on
Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2007).
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST
OF TREATIES OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE
ON JANUARY 1, 2011, at 383 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/169274.pdf.
17. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1978)
[hereinafter Race Convention]; see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 16, at 447.
18. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(1988) [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 16, at
472.
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any changes in domestic legal norms. The Senate relied on
those assurances as a basis for its consent to treaty ratification.19
As of 1994, it was probably true that the United States could
have achieved full compliance, or almost full compliance, with
its treaty obligations by aggressively implementing the human
rights protections then available under federal statutory and
constitutional law. However, since that time, many states have
adopted laws and policies that are in tension with the nation’s
human rights treaty obligations20 and the federal government
has done little to counter those trends. Meanwhile, Congress has
enacted several statutes restricting the availability of judicial
remedies for individuals whose constitutional and statutory
rights are violated.21 Additionally, the federal courts have
adopted narrowing interpretations of both substantive rights
and judicial remedies,22 thereby restricting the scope of
protection available under statutory and constitutional
provisions that Presidents Bush and Clinton relied upon as a
basis for assurances that the United States would comply with its
human rights treaty obligations. The net effect of these
developments is that the US record of compliance with human
rights treaty obligations is worse today than it was in 1994.
Numerous aspects of US policies and practices do not
satisfy international human rights standards.23 This Part
19. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 139–42, 175–88
(1999) (providing detailed support for the claims made in this paragraph).
20. See infra notes 24–29, 43–45, 77–87 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) (restricting the
availability of federal habeas corpus relief for individuals convicted of crimes in state
courts); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66
(1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006)) (restricting the availability of
judicial remedies for prisoners who allege violations of their constitutional rights);
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)) (providing
for expedited removal of so-called “criminal aliens”).
22. See generally Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative
Constitutional Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (2009); Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343 (2002); Judith
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 223 (2003); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as
an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006).
23. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of
the Committee against Torture: United States of America, U.N. Doc.
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addresses three issues: (i) life without parole for juvenile
offenders, (ii) felon disenfranchisement laws, and (iii)
conditions in maximum security prisons. These examples
illustrate the ways in which US policies and practices unrelated
to the War on Terror are inconsistent with US obligations under
international human rights treaties.
A. Juvenile Life Without Parole
As of early 2010, there were more than 2500 individuals
serving life without parole (“LWOP”) sentences in the United
States for crimes they committed as juveniles.24 The US Supreme
Court ruled in May 2010 in Graham v. Florida that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits LWOP sentences for juveniles who
committed non-homicide offenses.25 The Court’s ruling
effectively reversed the LWOP sentences of 123 juvenile
offenders.26 That still leaves more than 2400 juvenile offenders
convicted of homicide offenses who are serving LWOP
sentences. As of 1992, when the United States ratified the
ICCPR, there were fewer than 500 juvenile offenders serving
LWOP sentences.27 As of 1976, when the ICCPR first entered
into force internationally, there were fewer than twenty juvenile
offenders serving LWOP sentences.28 Thus, the magnitude of
the problem has increased exponentially over the past few
decades.29
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006) (evaluating US compliance with the Torture
Convention); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United
States of America, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008) (evaluating US
compliance with the Race Convention); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Concluding Observations:
Human Rights Committee] (evaluating US compliance with the ICCPR).
24. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE 16 (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jlwopchart.pdf
(reporting a total of 2574 juvenile offenders serving life without parole ("LWOP")
sentences in the United States).
25. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2014–15 (2010).
26. See id. at 2023–24.
27. See AMNESTY INT’L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2005).
28. See id.
29. The annual number of juvenile LWOP sentences peaked in about 1996–97
and began declining after that. See id.
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Article 24(1) of the ICCPR provides: “Every child shall have
. . . such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor.”30 Although the United States adopted various
reservations to limit the scope of its treaty obligations when it
ratified the ICCPR, it did not adopt any reservation to Article
24(1).31 Hence, Article 24(1) imposes a legally binding treaty
obligation on the United States.32 The Human Rights
Committee, which is the treaty body created by the ICCPR to
oversee treaty implementation, has expressed the view that
“sentencing children to [a] life sentence without parole is of
itself not in compliance with [A]rticle 24(1) of the Covenant.”33
The Committee’s conclusion that juvenile LWOP violates
Article 24(1) is not dispositive because the ICCPR does not
grant the Committee authority to issue final, authoritative treaty
interpretations. Even so, other authorities support the
Committee’s view that a ban on juvenile LWOP is a “measure of
protection” required by Article 24. First, the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Graham contains a lengthy passage explaining why—
due to unique features of juvenile offenders—the imposition of
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders constitutes “cruel and
unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.34
The Court’s rationale also supports the conclusion that special
psychological and emotional characteristics of children mean
that a ban on LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders is required
under Article 24.
Second, Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties stipulates that “any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation” must be considered in

30. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 24(1).
31. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (showing the US
reservations to the ICCPR).
32. The United States did adopt a reservation to Article 10, stipulating that “the
United States reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat juveniles as
adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Article 10.” See id. However, that
reservation does not purport to restrict or modify US obligations under Article 24. See
id.
33. Concluding Observations: Human Rights Committee, supra note 23, para. 34.
34. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–30 (2010).
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ascertaining the correct interpretation of the treaty.35 Since
entry into force of the ICCPR, states throughout the world have
prohibited the imposition of LWOP sentences for juvenile
offenders. More than 190 nations are parties to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which expressly prohibits the
imposition of “life imprisonment without possibility of
release . . . for offences committed by persons below eighteen
years of age.”36 Moreover, a comprehensive survey of domestic
laws and practices shows that “only 11 nations authorize life
without parole for juvenile offenders under any circumstances;
and only 2 of them, the United States and [one other state],
ever impose the punishment in practice.”37 Thus, consistent
state practice since entry into force of the ICCPR manifests nearuniversal agreement that a ban on LWOP sentences for juvenile
offenders is a “measure of protection” required by their status as
minors, and hence required by Article 24 of the ICCPR.
The United States’ failure to comply with Article 24 is
attributable to several factors. First, there has been a trend in
state criminal justice policies throughout the United States
towards progressively harsher sentences for criminal offenders.
This trend began before the United States ratified the ICCPR
and has continued since. The Supreme Court could apply the
Eighth Amendment to curb the harshest consequences of this
trend, but the Court has imposed few Eighth Amendment
constraints on state criminal sentencing practices outside the
death penalty context.38 Congress could invoke its treaty
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
36. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
37. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 (citing MICHELLE LEIGHTON & CONNIE DE LA VEGA,
SENTENCING OUR CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON: GLOBAL LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2007)
(unpublished manuscript)). The Court’s opinion in Graham cites Professors Leighton
and de la Vega for the proposition that Israel also imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile
offenders. An Israeli colleague assures me that this is not true. Thus, the United States
may be the only state in the world that actually imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile
offenders.
38. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (rejecting the Eighth
Amendment challenge to California’s “three strikes” law); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that a mandatory life sentence for drug possession did not
violate the Eighth Amendment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding that
a mandatory life sentence under a Texas recidivist statute did not violate the Eighth
Amendment). Under the Court’s analysis in Graham, the Court looks for “objective
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implementation power, as recognized in Missouri v. Holland,39 to
constrain state criminal justice policies that are inconsistent with
US treaty obligations, but to date Congress has shown little
inclination to do so. Moreover, some commentators assert that
Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Lopez40 and United
States v. Morrison41 raise doubts about the scope of Congress’
treaty implementation power under Missouri.42
B. Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
According to the best available data, “more than 5 million
citizens will be ineligible to vote in the midterm elections in
November [2010], including nearly 4 million who reside in the
35 states that still prohibit some combination of persons on
probation, parole, and/or people who have completed their
sentence from voting.”43 Felon disenfranchisement laws affect
three groups of people: those currently in prison, those released
on probation or parole, and those convicted felons who have
fully served their sentences and have been released for reintegration into the community. Non-incarcerated felons “make
up approximately three-quarters of the disenfranchised

indicia of society’s standards . . . to determine whether there is a national consensus
against the sentencing practice at issue.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (emphasis added)
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Court found a consensus against juvenile LWOP for non-homicide
offenses. See id. at 2023–26. However, the Court would be hard pressed to find a
national (vice international) consensus against juvenile LWOP for homicide offenses.
Therefore, the Court is unlikely to rule that juvenile LWOP for homicide violates the
Eighth Amendment.
39. 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that Congress has the power to enact legislation
designed to implement a treaty, even if the legislation would be invalid in the absence
of a treaty).
40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
41. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
42. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 390 (1998) (urging the Supreme Court to overrule Missouri); Nicholas Quinn
Rosencranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005) (also advocating
a reversal of Missouri, but for different reasons). But see David M. Golove, Treaty-Making
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power,
98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000) (defending the continued vitality of the Court’s holding
in Missouri).
43. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM, 1997–2010, at 3 (2010).
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population . . . .”44 “While a number of other countries . . .
deny voting rights to prison inmates, the United States is unique
in restricting the rights of nonincarcerated felons . . . .”45
Under Article 25 of the ICCPR, “[e]very citizen shall have
the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions . . . [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage . . . .”46
The “distinctions mentioned in [A]rticle 2” include distinctions
based on race.47 In the United States, “[r]acial disparities in the
criminal justice system . . . translate into higher rates of
disenfranchisement in communities of color, resulting in one of
every eight adult black males being ineligible to vote.”48 Given
the disproportionate impact of felon disenfranchisement laws
on black males, such laws are arguably inconsistent with the US
treaty obligation to “ensure” the right to vote “to all individuals
within its territory . . . without distinction of any kind . . . .”49
Indeed, the Human Rights Committee has concluded that felon
disenfranchisement laws in the United States “do not meet the
requirements” of the ICCPR.50 However, that conclusion must
be qualified because the United States ratified the ICCPR
subject to an “understanding” that the treaty permits
“distinctions based upon race . . . when such distinctions are, at
minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective.”51
Setting aside the racially discriminatory impact of felon
disenfranchisement laws, there is a compelling argument that a
44. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences
of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 778 (2002).
45. Id.
46. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 25.
47. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 2.
48. Porter, supra note 43, at 3.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. One detailed
study concluded that, due to the racially discriminatory impact of felon
disenfranchisement laws, those laws “played a decisive role in [some] US Senate
elections in recent years. Moreover, at least one Republican presidential victory would
have been reversed if former felons had been allowed to vote.” Uggen & Manza, supra
note 44, at 777.
49. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 2.
50. See Concluding Observations: Human Rights Committee, supra note 23, para.
35.
51. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, supra note 31.
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subset of such laws are inconsistent with US treaty obligations
under Article 25 of the ICCPR.52 Article 25 prohibits
“unreasonable restrictions” on the right to vote. The United
States did not adopt any reservation to Article 25;53 hence, the
treaty prohibition on “unreasonable restrictions” is binding on
the United States as a matter of international law. Over the past
decade, the Supreme Court of Canada,54 the South African
Constitutional Court,55 the Australian High Court,56 and the
European Court of Human Rights (in cases originating in the
United Kingdom and Austria)57 have all held that laws
disenfranchising incarcerated prisoners impose unreasonable
restrictions on the prisoners’ voting rights.58 None of those cases
involved disenfranchisement of convicted felons who had been
released from prison.
In contrast, as noted above, non-incarcerated felons “make
up approximately three-quarters of the disenfranchised
population” in the United States.59 Twelve states in the United
States maintain laws that deprive at least some ex-offenders of
the right to vote even after they have fully served their
sentences.60 If disenfranchisement of incarcerated prisoners is
unreasonable, as held by foreign and international tribunals,
then the US practice of disenfranchising ex-felons who have
52. See generally Reuven Ziegler, Legal Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon Suffrage:
Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 197 (2011)
(providing a detailed defense of this argument).
53. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, supra note 31.
54. See Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).
55. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Nat’l Inst. for Crime Prevention & the Reintegration
of Offenders (NICRO) 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) (S. Afr.).
56. Roach v. Electoral Comm'r [2007] 233 CLR 162 (Austl.).
57. Frodl v. Austria, App. No. 20201/04, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2011); Hirst v.
United Kingdom (No.2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187.
58. None of the cited decisions is based primarily on Article 25 of the ICCPR.
Nevertheless, the primary rationale for all of these decisions was that the challenged
restrictions on voting rights were unreasonable. See generally Ziegler, supra note 52;
Michael Plaxton & Heather Lardy, Prisoner Disenfranchisement: Four Judicial Approaches,
28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 101 (2010).
59. Uggen & Manza, supra note 44, at 778.
60. Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia “deny the right to vote to all persons
with felony convictions, even after they have completed their sentences.” THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2011). Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, and
Wyoming “disenfranchise certain categories of ex-offenders and/or permit application
for restoration of rights for specified offenses after a waiting period.” See id. at 1, 3 tbl.
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been released from prison and are no longer on probation or
parole is clearly an “unreasonable restriction” within the
meaning of Article 25. Indeed, the National Commission on
Federal Election Reform recommended in 2001 that all states
restore voting rights to citizens who fully serve their sentences,61
but that recommendation has not been fully implemented.
Hence, the Human Rights Committee correctly concluded “that
general deprivation of the right to vote for persons who have
received a felony conviction, and in particular those who are no
longer deprived of liberty, do not meet the requirements of
[A]rticle[] 25” of the ICCPR.62
In contrast to the juvenile LWOP issue, US practice
involving felon disenfranchisement has improved somewhat
since the mid-1990s. “[S]ince 1997, 23 states have amended
felony disenfranchisement policies in an effort to reduce their
restrictiveness and expand voter eligibility.”63 Despite these
improvements, the laws in many states remain inconsistent with
the nation’s treaty obligations under the ICCPR. One could
blame US non-compliance on recalcitrant state legislators, but
that explanation is not entirely convincing. The federal
executive branch could take significant steps to remedy the
problem by engaging in more vigorous enforcement of the
Voting Rights Act.64 Insofar as the president’s current authority
may be insufficient, Congress could amend the Voting Rights
Act to expand the president’s authority to compel changes in
state laws to ensure full compliance with US treaty obligations.65
61. See THE NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 45 (2001).
62. Concluding Observations: Human Rights Committee, supra note 23, para. 35.
63. Porter, supra note 43, at 1.
64. See generally Daniel H. Wolf, An Extraordinary Facilitator: The Voting Rights Act
and U.S. Adherence to International Human Rights Treaty Obligations, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
1149 (2010).
65. There are two independent constitutional arguments that Congress could
invoke as a basis for its authority to enact such legislation. First, Congress could invoke
its treaty implementation power under Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In this
author’s opinion, Congress’ power to implement treaties should be sufficient to sustain
the constitutional validity of legislation that Congress deems necessary to ensure
compliance with US treaty obligations. However, the scope of Congress’ treaty
implementation power is contested. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Second,
Congress could invoke its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, at
least insofar as federal legislation is designed to remedy racially discriminatory effects
of felon disenfranchisement laws. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see
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C. Prison Overcrowding and Maximum Security Prisons
Article 10(1) of the ICCPR provides: “All persons deprived
of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect
for the inherent dignity of the human person.”66 The United
States did not adopt a reservation to limit the scope of its
obligations under this provision.67 Hence, the provision is
binding on the United States under international law. There are
two reasons why the record of US compliance with Article 10(1)
has deteriorated since the United States ratified the ICCPR in
1992. First, any Eighth Amendment violation related to
prisoners’ rights is also a violation of Article 10(1). Second, the
available evidence suggests that the incidence of prisoners’
rights violations—especially unremedied violations—has
increased significantly since 1995.
Consider, first, the relationship between Article 10(1) and
the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment creates only
negative obligations: it prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishments.”68 In contrast, Article 10(1) of the ICCPR creates
an affirmative obligation to treat prisoners “with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person.” Thus, a purely textual
analysis suggests that international law sets a higher standard
than domestic law. However, two factors counterbalance this
textual analysis. First, US prisoners are protected by the full
panoply of constitutional rights, including the First
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause, in addition to the Eighth
Amendment.69 Second, Supreme Court jurisprudence has
expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment well beyond the
plain meaning of the text. Under established doctrine, the
Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials an affirmative
duty to care for prisoners.70 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly

also Wolf, supra note 64, at 1173–77 (discussing reliance on Section 5 to promote
compliance with human rights treaty obligations).
66. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 10(1).
67. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, supra note 31.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
69. See generally MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (3d ed. 2003).
70. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976).
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affirmed that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”71
Even so, there are certain respects in which international
human rights law is more protective of prisoners’ rights than US
constitutional law. To succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim
challenging conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy
both an objective and subjective test.72 To satisfy the objective
component of the test, prisoners must show that they have been
deprived “of a single, identifiable human need such as food,
warmth, or exercise . . . .”73 In contrast, the European Court of
Human Rights has set a much lower standard for “degrading
treatment” claims, holding that treatment is degrading if it is
“such as to arouse in the victims feeling [sic] of fear, anguish
and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them.”74
Moreover, the European Court does not require prisoners to
prove any particular mens rea element to establish a claim for
degrading treatment.75 In contrast, the subjective component of
an Eighth Amendment claim requires a showing of “deliberate
indifference” to the prisoner’s needs, which the Court has
construed as a recklessness standard.76 Thus, one may fairly
conclude, at a minimum, that any violation of a prisoner’s
Eighth Amendment rights is also a violation of ICCPR Article
10(1).
Moreover, the incidence of unremedied Eighth
Amendment violations has increased significantly since the
United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. This is due to a
confluence of three factors: 1) passage of the Prison Litigation
71. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958))).
72. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–302 (1991).
73. Id. at 304.
74. Van der Ven v. Netherlands, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, ¶ 48 (2003). The
jurisprudence of the European Court provides persuasive, but not binding, authority
for interpreting analogous provisions of the ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee
often consults the European Court’s jurisprudence as a guide to construing analogous
ICCPR provisions. Moreover, the language in Article 7 of the ICCPR is virtually
identical to the language in Article 3 of the European Convention. Compare ICCPR,
supra note 16, art. 7 (prohibiting “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment”) with European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (prohibiting “inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment”).
75. See Iwanczuk v. Poland, 38 E.H.R.R. 8, ¶¶ 51–52 (2001).
76. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 836–37 (1994).
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Reform Act in 1995; 2) the dramatic growth in the US prison
population over the past two decades; and 3) increased numbers
of prisoners housed in maximum security prisons.
Judicial oversight of prison conditions has declined as a
result of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).77 Since
passage of the PLRA, “prisoners’ federal filing rates have
declined 60 percent, from 26 federal cases per thousand
prisoners in 1995 to fewer than 11 cases per thousand prisoners
in 2006.”78 Proponents of the PLRA hoped that the legislation
would reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits without affecting
meritorious claims. Unfortunately, the best available empirical
analysis suggests that the PLRA has also made it much more
difficult for prisoners to bring meritorious claims,79 thereby
increasing the number of constitutional violations that are left
without a remedy.
Second, the number of prisoners detained in state and
federal correctional institutions has grown enormously over the
past fifteen years. Federal prisons housed about 205,000 inmates
in 2009,80 more than double the figure of about 82,000 inmates
in 1995.81 State prisons housed about 1.32 million inmates in
2009,82 compared to roughly 942,000 inmates in 1995.83
Construction of additional prison capacity has not kept pace
with the increasing prison population. Federal prisons were
operating at thirty-seven percent over capacity in 2005,
compared to twenty-four percent over capacity in 1995. State
prisons were operating at twelve percent over capacity in 2005,
compared to three percent over capacity in 1995.84 The
77. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66
(1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006)).
78. Margo Schlanger et al., ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of
Prisoners, 25 SUM CRIM. JUST. 14, 19 (2010).
79. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1644–64
(2003).
80. LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
231681, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 1, 7 app. tbl.2
(2010).
81. JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
164266, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995, at iv (1997).
82. See GLAZE, supra note 80, at 1, 7 app. tbl.2.
83. See STEPHAN, supra note 81, at iv.
84. See JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 222182, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005, at 3
(2005); see also STEPHAN, supra note 81, at iv.
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Supreme Court has acknowledged that overcrowding can be a
key factor contributing to the deprivation of prisoners’
constitutional rights.85
The population of maximum security prisons has also
grown steadily over the past two decades.86 Although each
maximum security prison is different, these prisons, as a group,
impose the most severe restrictions on individual liberty, and
hence raise the most significant human rights concerns. The
Supreme Court described the conditions in one maximum
security prison as follows:
Conditions at OSP are more restrictive than any other form
of incarceration in Ohio . . . In OSP almost every aspect of
an inmate’s life is controlled and monitored. Inmates must
remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23
hours per day. A light remains on in the cell at all times,
though it is sometimes dimmed, and an inmate who
attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further
discipline. During the one hour per day that an inmate may
leave his cell, access is limited to one of two indoor
recreation cells. Incarceration at OSP is synonymous with
extreme isolation . . . OSP cells have solid metal doors with
metal strips along their sides and bottoms which prevent
conversation or communication with other inmates. All
meals are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a
common eating area. Opportunities for visitation are rare
and in all events are conducted through glass walls. It is fair
to say OSP inmates are deprived of almost any
environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human
contact.87

Such conditions appear to be incompatible with standards
for conditions of confinement recently promulgated by the
American Bar Association.88 Not surprisingly, the Human Rights
85. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
86. Federal maximum security prisons housed 21,855 inmates in 2005, compared
to 9272 inmates in 1995. State maximum security prisons housed 491,240 inmates in
2005, compared to 354,000 inmates in 1995. See STEPHAN, supra note 84, app. tbl.11;
STEPHAN, supra note 81, at 9.
87. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005).
88. See AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS 23-3.1–23-3.9 (3d ed. 2010).
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Committee concluded “that conditions in some maximum
security prisons are incompatible” with US obligations under
Article 10(1).89
In sum, the dramatic growth in the nation’s prison
population since 1995, and especially the increased numbers of
prisoners housed in maximum security prisons, has undoubtedly
led to an increase in the overall number of prisoners who have
legitimate grievances about violations of their constitutional
rights. Meanwhile, the PLRA has led to an increase in the
percentage of constitutional violations that go unremedied.
Since every violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights is also a
violation of US human rights treaty obligations, the gap between
treaty requirements and US performance has expanded
significantly since the United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992.
II. WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES COMPLY WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY COMMITMENTS?
Part I showed that the United States is not complying fully
with its human rights treaty obligations. But, one might ask, why
should the United States comply with its treaty commitments?
Part II contends that the United States should comply with its
human rights treaty obligations to promote both foreign and
domestic policy goals. The nation’s failure to comply with its
treaty obligations has a significant negative impact on key
foreign policy objectives. Moreover, compliance with
international human rights norms would help the United States
fulfill the higher moral aspirations of its citizens. The next two
Sections consider each set of arguments separately.
A. Foreign Policy Considerations
In 1974, Congress enacted legislation specifying that “a
principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be
to promote the increased observance of internationally
recognized human rights by all countries.”90 The legislation
added that the goal of promoting “increased respect for human
89. See Concluding Observations: Human Rights Committee, supra note 23, para.
32.
90. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 502B, 88 Stat. 1795, 1815
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2006)).
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rights and fundamental freedoms” was consistent with US
obligations under the UN Charter and “in keeping with the
constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States.”91
Since that time, Congress has enacted numerous statutes—such
as the International Religious Freedom Act of 199892 and the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 200093—
designed to promote greater protection for human rights in
countries around the world.94
One key element of the federal statutory scheme is a
requirement for the US Department of State to provide annual
reports on human rights practices in foreign countries.95 As
Professor Sarah Cleveland has noted, the requirement to
compile information for the annual reports “provokes constant
interactions around human rights norms between US and
foreign government personnel and other foreign actors.”96
Consequently, international human rights concerns have
become an integral part of the day-to-day conduct of US foreign
affairs. An official State Department publication released during
the Reagan administration asserted: “The cause of human rights
forms the core of American foreign policy; it is central to
America’s conception of itself.”97 Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton recently declared that the cause of advancing
“human rights is a daily priority for the men and women of the
Department of State, both in Washington and in our embassies
overseas.”98
When the United States breaches its international treaty
commitments it undermines diplomatic efforts to promote
respect for human rights in other countries. In a series of
amicus briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court over the past
decade, former senior diplomats have highlighted the link
91. Id.
92. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat.
2787 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (2006)).
93. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006)).
94. For a brief summary of US legislation on human rights, see LOUIS HENKIN ET
AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 1025–28, 1037–41 (2d ed. 2009).
95. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (2006).
96. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 90 (2001).
97. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 24 (1988).
98. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PREFACE (2011).
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between respect for human rights at home and the conduct of
US foreign policy abroad. For example, in 2001, former
diplomats argued in a case involving capital punishment of
mentally retarded individuals that “the current United States
practice of executing people suffering from mental retardation
is inconsistent with evolving international standards of decency,”
and “that North Carolina’s continuation of the practice in this
case would strain diplomatic relations with close American allies,
increasing America’s diplomatic isolation and impairing other
United States foreign policy interests.”99 The same group of nine
former diplomats—a group that included some of the nation’s
most illustrious ambassadors100—raised similar concerns a few
years later in a case involving the death penalty for juvenile
offenders.101
A distinct group of former US diplomats filed a series of
amicus briefs in support of individuals detained in the War on
Terror. For example, in Rasul v. Bush,102 a case involving
detention of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, a
distinguished group of former US diplomats asserted:
The courts below denied review of the executive branch’s
incarceration of the petitioners, effectively holding that
when the executive acts against foreign citizens on foreign
soil, it may do so with impunity, free of even minimal
judicial review. These rulings undermine what has long
been one of our proudest diplomatic advantages—this
nation’s constitutional guaranty, enforced by an
independent judiciary, against arbitrary government power.
The rulings have not gone unnoticed abroad. [Some
foreign] [g]overnments . . . have even interpreted the

99. Brief for Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 531 U.S. 1205 (2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL
648607, at *2. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed McCarver v. North Carolina, but
considered the identical issue in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
100. The amici in these cases included four career diplomats who “retired with
the rank of Career Ambassador, the highest rank that can be awarded to members of
the United States Foreign Service.” See Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton
Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448, at *5.
101. See id.
102. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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rulings as a license to incarcerate their own citizens and
others without judicial review.103

A similar group of more than twenty former diplomats
reiterated these arguments when the Guantanamo litigation
returned to the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush,104
contending that “denial of habeas corpus to prisoners at
Guantanamo undermine[s] one of our country’s most
important diplomatic assets—our perceived commitment to the
rule of law.”105
In Samantar v. Yousuf,106 a defendant accused of torture and
extrajudicial killing argued that he was entitled to immunity
from suit in US courts because plaintiffs’ claims arose from
actions allegedly taken in his official capacity when he served as
a senior government official in Somalia.107 In response, a group
of twenty-six former US diplomats argued against “a blanket
extension of sovereign immunity to former foreign officials in
the narrow and discrete context of their being sued in United
States courts for alleged torture and extrajudicial executions.”108
They added: “Plaintiffs allege that a former senior official of a
brutal and undemocratic regime was responsible for their
torture and for extrajudicial executions of their family
members . . . [O]ur fundamental foreign policy commitment to
human rights and the rule of law—cornerstones of American
foreign policy for decades—may be vindicated by allowing our
courts to hear the suit.”109 In short, domestic judicial application
of international human rights norms helps reinforce the
103. Brief for Diego C. Asencio et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2003 WL 22490560, at *4.
104. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
105. Brief for Former US Diplomats Diego C. Asencio et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 061196), 2007 WL 2414900, at *1; see Brief for Former US Diplomats J. Brian Atwood et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009)
(No. 08-368), 2009 WL 216168, at *1–2 (contending that “allowing [the lower court
decision] to stand will undercut the positive effects on American diplomacy of this
Court’s decision in Boumediene”).
106. 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
107. See id. at 2282–84.
108. Brief for Former US Diplomats Morton I. Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555),
2010 WL 342036, at *6.
109. Id. at *8–9.
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nation’s foreign policy commitment to human rights and the
rule of law.
One final case merits discussion in this context. In July
2011, the United States submitted an amicus brief to the
Supreme Court supporting a stay of execution for Humberto
Leal Garcia, a Mexican national on death row in Texas.110 The
Obama administration argued that the “case implicates United
States foreign-policy interests of the highest order” because
petitioner’s execution would place “the United States in
irremediable breach of its international” treaty obligations.111
The government added that such a breach of treaty obligations
“would have serious repercussions for United States foreign
relations.”112 Reportedly, “former president George W. Bush
also appealed for Leal’s execution to be halted on the grounds it
could jeopardise . . . US diplomatic interests.”113 Thus,
Presidents George W. Bush and Obama apparently agree with
former US diplomats that the United States’ failure to comply
with its treaty commitments has serious negative foreign policy
consequences.
In sum, for the past several decades there has been strong
bipartisan support in both Congress and the executive branch
for treating international human rights as a core element of US
foreign policy. Senior government officials responsible for the
nation’s international diplomacy agree that the US failure to
honor its human rights treaty commitments at home has
significant negative repercussions for the conduct of US foreign
affairs.

110. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Applications for
a Stay, Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011), (Nos. 11A1, 11A2), 2011 WL
2630156.
111. Id. at *11–12. Granted, this case involves US obligations under the United
Nations Charter and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, neither of which is
a human rights treaty. Nevertheless, in specific cases raising human rights concerns, the
negative foreign policy consequences of treaty violations are similar, regardless of
whether the treaty at issue is technically classified as a human rights treaty.
112. Id. at *12.
113. Chris McGreal, Humberto Leal Garcia Executed in Texas Despite White House
Appeal, GUARDIAN (London), July 7, 2011, at 2. Texas executed him despite these
interventions. See id.
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B. Domestic Policy Considerations
International human rights law is rooted in a commitment
to the values of human dignity, equality, and individual
autonomy. In the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, the
drafters affirmed their “faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women.”114 Shortly after adopting the UN Charter,
the member states of the United Nations endorsed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,115 the foundational document of
modern international human rights law. Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration declares: “All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights.”116 Article 2 adds: “Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”117
The principles embodied in the Universal Declaration are
not “foreign” or “alien” concepts. They are fundamental
American values,118 codified in the US Constitution, and then
restated in the Universal Declaration and other international
human rights instruments. Although the specific language
included in international human rights treaties is slightly
different from the language of the US Constitution, the
underlying values are the same.119 Indeed, public opinion data
shows that US citizens strongly endorse the core principles of
international human rights law.120 For example, seventy-seven
percent of those surveyed agreed that the “government should
‘protect’ human rights for everyone.”121 Thus, the United States
should comply with international human right norms because
114. U.N. Charter pmbl.
115. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
116. Id. art. 1.
117. Id. art. 2.
118. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT
AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
119. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 143–56 (1990).
120. See Alan Jenkins & Kevin Shawn Hsu, American Ideals & Human Rights:
Findings from New Public Opinion Research by the Opportunity Agenda, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
439 (2008).
121. See id. at 445.
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compliance promotes values cherished by the vast majority of
US citizens.
Unfortunately, over the past few decades state and federal
officials in the United States have adopted a series of laws and
policies that are at odds with core American values. Politics in
the United States has been dominated by fear. We fear “career
criminals,” so state legislators enact laws authorizing life
imprisonment for petty offenses.122 We fear “terrorists,” so the
federal executive branch adopts policies authorizing indefinite
detention of accused terrorists without providing them a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual allegations that
ostensibly support the decision to detain them.123 We fear
“aliens,” so Congress enacts laws to remove aliens from the
United States without affording them the procedural safeguards
necessary to ensure that they will not be persecuted in the
destination country.124
122. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2011) (requiring life
imprisonment for a so-called “third strike”); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to California’s three strikes law and
upholding a life sentence for a man convicted of stealing three golf clubs).
123. Congress has authorized the use of military commissions to conduct criminal
trials of alleged terrorists. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006)); Military Commissions
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §
948a (2006 & Supp. 2010)). However, both the Bush and Obama administrations have
conceded that there are a significant number of detainees whom the government
intends to detain indefinitely, without ever subjecting them to criminal trials. See Exec.
Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. 13567 (2011); Presidential Military Order on Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). Congress has never
enacted legislation that explicitly authorizes such indefinite detention. Pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), individuals
subject to indefinite detention have a right to file habeas corpus petitions to challenge
the legality of their detention. However, recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit, which is
the only appellate court other than the Supreme Court with authority to review such
petitions, raise doubts as to whether the current system provides a meaningful
opportunity for alleged terrorists to challenge the factual assertions invoked by the
government as a basis for their continued detention. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C.
Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011) (reviewing the D.C.
Circuit’s development of evolving federal common law standards for judicial review of
executive detention policies).
124. In 1996, Congress enacted legislation providing for “expedited removal” of
certain aliens seeking admission to the United States. Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 422 (2006)), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as
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Policies based on these types of fears yield results that are
fundamentally at odds with the higher moral aspirations of most
Americans. Virtually all Americans agree that torture is morally
repugnant, but fear of alleged “terrorists“ produces policies that
make US government officials complicit in acts of torture.125
Americans value individual freedom, but the United States
imprisons a higher percentage of its population than any other
country in the world,126 because fear of crime prompts legislators
to adopt harsh penal policies that are inconsistent with the
nation’s moral commitment to individual freedom. The United
States needs international human rights law to help us realize
our own higher moral aspirations. We need international
human rights law as an antidote to the politics of fear that has
infected the American body politic over the past few decades.
Some will object that protection of human rights in the
United States should be based on domestic law, not foreign
law.127 This objection is unpersuasive because international
human rights law is not “foreign law.” The United States played
a very influential role in creating international human rights
law, and the diplomats who represented our nation in treaty
negotiations achieved great success in incorporating American
values into the text of international human rights treaties.128 The
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006)); see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M.
RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 506–07 (5th ed. 2009). Aliens
subject to expedited removal, including those who express a fear of persecution, are
entitled to minimal procedural safeguards to protect them against deportation to a
country where they risk persecution. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra, at 1052–56.
Hence, critics allege that the expedited removal process, as a practical matter, results in
deportation of refugees to countries where they will likely be persecuted, contrary to
US treaty obligations under the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. See, e.g.,
Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules are Made to be Broken: How the Process of
Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 167–72 (2006).
125. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Jane Mayer,
Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106.
126. The United States incarcerates 743 prisoners per 100,000 population. The
next highest incarceration rate is in Rwanda (595 per 100,000), followed by Russia (550
per 100,000), Georgia (547 per 100,000), and the Virgin Islands (539 per 100,000).
Iran ranks 38th at 291 per 100,000. China ranks 117th, at 122 per 100,000. See World
Prison Brief, INT'L CENTRE FOR PRISON STUD., http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/
worldbrief/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
127. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1971 (2004).
128. See GLENDON, supra note 118, at 236.
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US Senate voted in favor of US ratification of the ICCPR, the
Race Convention, and the Torture Convention.129 Under the
Constitution, ratified treaties are the “supreme Law of the
Land.”130 Thus, ratified human rights treaties are part of the
corpus of supreme federal law.131
Moreover, this Article does not advocate delegation of
authority to an international tribunal to pass judgment on US
compliance with its human rights treaty obligations. To the
contrary, the proposed legislation in the Appendix would give
domestic judges, not foreign judges, the power to decide in
individual cases whether the conduct of domestic government
officials is consistent with US treaty obligations.132 Moreover, the
proposed legislation specifies that decisions of foreign and
international tribunals construing international human rights
instruments shall be treated merely as persuasive authority, not
binding authority.133 Thus, the proposal does not raise any
legitimate concern about ceding sovereignty to foreigners
because federal and state judges appointed pursuant to standard
procedures for domestic judicial appointments would retain
final authority to adjudicate the merits of individual claims and
defenses.
Others may object that judicial application of human rights
norms, as opposed to legislative application of such norms, is
inconsistent with principles of democratic self-governance.134 To
state the point more bluntly, they do not want unelected judges

129. The official Senate record does not record the number of Senators voting in
favor of ratification, but the Senate approved all three treaties by at least a two-thirds
majority vote. See 140 CONG. REC. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) (Race
Convention); 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (ICCPR); 136 CONG.
REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Torture Convention).
130. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
131. Some may argue that the treaties are not part of supreme federal law because
the United States adopted non-self-executing declarations for all three treaties. The
proper interpretation of those non-self-executing declarations is contested. See David
Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1, 35–44 (2002) (summarizing different possible interpretations of non-self-executing
declarations). However, under any plausible interpretation, the treaties are part of the
corpus of supreme federal law. See id.
132. See Appendix.
133. See Appendix, § 7.
134. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human
Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1747–55 (2009).

2012]

LEGISLATING HUMAN RIGHTS

471

making decisions about US compliance with its treaty
obligations.
This objection stands the truth on its head. The relevant
comparison is not between judicial and legislative application of
human rights norms. The relevant comparison is between
judicial application of constitutional norms and judicial
application of treaty norms. Under current US practice, state and
federal courts rely primarily on constitutional norms to vindicate
human rights claims. When US courts apply constitutional law,
they are applying judge-made law that is not subject to any sort
of democratic check, because Congress cannot overrule the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. In contrast,
if US courts applied human rights treaties to resolve
fundamental rights claims, and Congress disapproved of the
courts’ application of the relevant treaty provisions, Congress
could enact legislation to overrule the courts.135 Thus, those who
favor greater legislative control over fundamental rights claims
should endorse a proposal for legislation to encourage greater
judicial reliance on international human rights treaties as an
alternative to excessive judicial reliance on the Constitution. In
short, domestic judicial application of international human
rights treaties—as an alternative to constitutional adjudication—
would enhance democratic self-governance.136
III. THE LIKELY SOURCE OF REFORM: CONGRESS OR THE
JUDICIARY?
Part I showed that the United States has failed to comply
with certain binding human rights treaty obligations. Part II
explained why there are sound policy reasons for the United
135. It is well-established that a later-enacted statute takes precedence over a prior
conflicting treaty as a matter of US domestic law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987). Therefore, if
Congress objects to an interpretation of a specific human rights treaty provision
adopted by the courts, Congress could enact a statute to override that provision for the
purpose of domestic law. Such a statute would not alter the United States’ international
legal obligations, but it would determine the scope of domestic legal protection for the
right at issue, as a matter of federal law, unless the courts construed the Constitution to
be more rights-protective than the statute.
136. For a more extended presentation of the argument presented in this
paragraph, see David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1 (2006).
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States to improve its human rights performance. Hence, the
question arises: which branch of government is most likely to
nudge US policies and practices toward improved compliance
with the nation’s human rights treaty obligations?
Some scholars have argued that human rights activists
should look to state and local governments to lead the way in
promoting domestic implementation of international human
rights norms.137 Clearly, much useful work can and has been
done at the state and local level to incorporate international
norms into domestic government policies.138 However, action at
the state and local level, without more, is not a viable
prescription for national compliance with human rights treaty
obligations; actions by state and local governments are too
isolated and sporadic to have a significant impact on the United
States’ overall record of compliance with its treaty
commitments.139 Hence, national compliance requires unified
action at the federal level.
The federal executive has taken some steps to improve
domestic implementation of international human rights norms.
For example, President Clinton adopted an executive order to
enhance domestic implementation of international human
rights treaty obligations.140 However, unilateral executive action
is unlikely to have a significant impact on US compliance with its
treaty obligations. Human rights treaties regulate the conduct of
state and local government officers in thousands of daily
interactions with private persons. The federal executive branch
lacks the resources to monitor all of those daily interactions. In
contrast, private individuals are well-situated to monitor state
and local government compliance with human rights treaties
because they are directly affected by treaty violations and they
have an incentive to correct those violations. Private monitoring
137. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001);
Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
138. See Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights
Change Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 474–79 (2008).
139. To the best of my knowledge, scholars who have urged greater reliance on
state and local governments do not seriously dispute this proposition. See Powell, supra
note 137; Resnik, supra note 137.
140. See Exec. Order No. 13,107, 3 C.F.R. 13107 (1998).

2012]

LEGISLATING HUMAN RIGHTS

473

will not have a significant impact on treaty compliance, though,
unless private individuals have access to a court that is
empowered to adjudicate human rights claims.141
The president cannot empower courts to adjudicate claims
based on human rights treaties because the United States
ratified the ICCPR, the Race Convention, and the Torture
Convention subject to declarations specifying that all three
treaties are non-self-executing.142 The precise meaning of those
declarations is disputed.143 At a minimum, though, the non-selfexecuting declarations mean that individuals cannot file suit to
enforce human rights treaties unless Congress enacts legislation
to authorize judicial enforcement. Per the Supreme Court
decision in Medellin v. Texas, the president lacks the
constitutional authority to convert a non-self-executing treaty
into a self-executing treaty.144 Therefore, unilateral presidential
action is not a viable solution to the problem of US
noncompliance with its treaty obligations.
Given the shortcomings of both the federal executive
branch and state and local governments, it is necessary to
consider both Congress and the federal judiciary as potential
agents of change. I contend that Congress is the branch most
likely to initiate progressive human rights reforms within the
next decade. This claim may seem surprising to many readers.
For the past half-century, legal discourse has been shaped by a
dominant image that portrays the federal courts as the primary
guarantor of fundamental human rights. That image was
certainly accurate during the Warren Court and into the
141. In theory, the federal government could create a new federal administrative
agency to adjudicate human rights claims against state and local government officers.
However, for the reasons explained below, creation of a new federal administrative
agency is neither realistic nor desirable. See infra text after note 167. If the government
wants to empower individuals to bring claims based on human rights treaties, the best
approach is to empower individuals to bring those claims in the same courts where they
are already litigating statutory and constitutional “human rights” claims.
142. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, supra note 31; Race
Convention: Declarations and Reservations, United States, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); Torture Convention: Declarations and
Reservations, United States, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#12 (last visited
Jan. 6, 2012); see also Sloss, supra note 19, at 131.
143. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 144–71.
144. 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008).

474 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:445
1970s.145 But there is nothing inherent in our separation-ofpowers system that makes the judiciary the guardian of human
rights, or Congress the enemy of human rights. Indeed, from
the 1890s until the 1930s, the Supreme Court was dominated by
conservative Justices who routinely thwarted progressive
legislation designed to enhance protection for human rights.146
During that era, Progressives placed their faith in Congress to
promote broader protection for human rights and conservatives
placed their faith in the federal judiciary to protect the interests
of corporate America.147 The point is that the ideological
alignment of the judicial and legislative branches is historically
contingent. During some historical periods, the judiciary has
been the leading champion of human rights, but in other
historical eras Congress has been more receptive to a human
rights agenda.
A. The Federal Judiciary as an Agent of Human Rights Reform
To appreciate the role of the federal judiciary as a potential
agent of human rights reform, it is helpful to distinguish three
possible mechanisms that, in theory, federal judges could use to
promote compliance with human rights treaty obligations:
“silent” judicial application, “indirect” judicial application, and
“direct” judicial application. Federal courts often promote
compliance with international norms by applying domestic
constitutional or statutory provisions without mentioning
analogous treaty provisions. This is “silent” judicial application.
For example, Article 19 of the ICCPR protects freedom of
expression,148 but the First Amendment provides equal or
greater protection for freedom of expression than is available
under Article 19.149 Thus, US courts promote compliance with
treaty obligations under Article 19 by applying the First
Amendment, even if they do not mention Article 19 or related
145. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Remembrance of Things Past?: Reflections
on the Warren Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1055 (2002).
146. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION
19–26 (2000).
147. See id. at 11–33.
148. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 19.
149. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 94, at 1233–52 (comparing protection for
freedom of expression in US constitutional law and international human rights law).
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international norms in their judicial opinions. When the United
States ratified the ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race
Convention, the Bush and Clinton administrations assured the
Senate that this type of “silent” judicial application would help
ensure compliance with US treaty obligations.150 Since that time,
silent judicial application has been the primary mechanism the
federal judiciary has employed to help promote US compliance
with its human rights treaty obligations.
Courts apply international human rights treaties
“indirectly” when they apply a domestic constitutional or
statutory provision as a rule of decision, and they invoke a treaty
provision to help interpret that domestic constitutional or
statutory norm. For example, US courts routinely invoke the
Torture Convention when they consider claims for “withholding
of removal” under 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.151 That regulation was
designed, in part, to implement Section 2242 of the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”),152 a
statute Congress enacted to implement US obligations under
Article 3 of the Torture Convention. Colloquially, people refer
to these types of claims as “Torture Convention claims.”
Technically, though, the courts are not applying the Torture
Convention directly when they adjudicate such claims. Rather,
courts are directly applying the relevant statute and regulations,
and they are invoking the treaty indirectly as an aid to
interpreting the governing statute and regulations.153
Courts apply treaties “directly” when they apply a treaty
provision as a rule of decision to resolve a disputed issue in a
case. US courts often apply treaties directly in this way. For
example, US courts have decided hundreds of cases involving

150. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 183–88.
151. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2011).
152. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §
2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006)).
153. It is important to distinguish in this respect between the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) and the draft legislation included in the
Appendix. FARRA did not authorize courts to apply Article 3 of the Torture
Convention directly as a rule of decision. Instead, FARRA authorized federal agencies
to enact regulations to implement US treaty obligations. See id. In contrast, the draft
legislation in the Appendix would authorize state and federal courts to apply relevant
provisions of the ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race Convention directly as
rules of decision. See Appendix.

476 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:445
direct application of the Warsaw Convention154 to resolve
controversies related to international air carriage.155 However,
US courts almost never apply international human rights treaties
directly. When the United States ratified the ICCPR, the Torture
Convention, and the Race Convention, it attached declarations
stipulating that the treaties are “not self-executing.”156 Those
declarations have effectively barred direct judicial application of
human rights treaties. Congress could enact legislation to
authorize direct application;157 until Congress does so, however,
courts will continue to cite the non-self-executing declarations as
a bar to direct application of human rights treaties.
In theory, the United States could achieve excellent
compliance with its human rights treaty obligations—even
without direct application of human rights treaties—if US courts
made aggressive use of their power to apply human rights
treaties indirectly as an aid to construing analogous statutory
and constitutional provisions, or if courts adopted liberal
interpretations of those provisions and applied the treaties
“silently.” However, the analysis in Part I demonstrates that the
combined effect of silent and indirect application has failed to
achieve a satisfactory record of US compliance with its human
rights treaty obligations. Moreover, it is very unlikely, at least for
the next decade, that the federal judiciary will utilize its
acknowledged power to engage in “indirect” and “silent” treaty
application to promote greater compliance with the nation’s
human rights treaty obligations. There are two reasons why this
154. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
155. See David Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009).
156. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
157. There are two aspects to the claim that Congress has the constitutional
authority to enact such legislation. First, Congress has the authority to reverse the effect
of the non-self-executing declarations by empowering courts to apply human rights
treaties directly as rules of decision. This proposition is not controversial. Second,
Congress has the power to regulate matters that would otherwise be regulated
exclusively by state and local governments. This proposition is controversial. The
controversy hinges primarily on the continued vitality of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920). See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. As noted above, I believe
that Congress’ treaty implementation power under Missouri is sufficient to sustain the
constitutional validity of legislation that Congress deems necessary to ensure
compliance with US treaty obligations. See supra note 65.
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is so. First, the federal judiciary is quite conservative. And
second, the composition of the federal judiciary changes very
slowly.
In 1968, President Johnson nominated Associate Justice
Abe Fortas to replace Earl Warren as Chief Justice. Senate
deliberations proceeded in the midst of the politically charged
1968 presidential campaign. The Republican presidential
nominee, Richard Nixon, worked behind the scenes with Senate
Republicans to defeat Fortas’ nomination.158 Nixon took office
in January 1969, determined to alter the ideological
composition of the federal judiciary. Over the next three years,
he appointed a new Chief Justice (Warren Burger) and three
new Associate Justices.159 These appointments initiated a
dramatic shift to the right: in the two decades from 1970 to
1991, Republican presidents appointed one Chief Justice
(Rehnquist) and nine Associate Justices.160 The only Democratic
president during this period, Jimmy Carter, did not appoint a
single Supreme Court Justice. Since the 1968 presidential
campaign, every Republican president has made a campaign
pledge to appoint conservative judges. With limited exceptions,
they have delivered on their pledges. At present, about sixty
percent of federal appellate judges are Republican appointees,
and only forty percent are Democratic appointees.161
Sophisticated empirical studies show that the median federal

158. See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 2–4 (2001).
159. See RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE US SUPREME COURT
36–45 (1980).
160. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. OF
AM., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
161. As of September 2011, there were 159 US Court of Appeals judges (including
senior judges) appointed by Republican Presidents, and 108 US Court of Appeals
judges (including senior judges) appointed by Democratic Presidents. See Number of US
Court of Appeals Judges Appointed by Republican/Democratic Presidents, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov (follow “Judge and Judgeships” hyperlink; then follow
“Biographical Directory of Judges” hyperlink; then follow “Select research categories”
hyperlink; then select “Court type”, “Party of Nominating President”, and “Limit
Query to Sitting Judges”, then search “U.S. Court of Appeals” for “Court type”,
“Republican” or “Democrat” for “Party of Nominating President” and “All Sitting
Judges” for “Limit Query to Sitting Judges”; then follow “Search” hyperlink) (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012).
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appellate judge is moderately conservative,162 and conservative
judges outnumber liberal judges by a factor of about 1.8 to 1.163
Thus, the current federal judiciary, as a group, is not
ideologically inclined to adopt the “silent” or “indirect” treaty
application strategies that would enhance compliance with US
human rights treaty obligations.
Moreover, the composition of the federal judiciary changes
slowly. There are currently 179 authorized judgeships for US
Court of Appeals judges, and 677 authorized judgeships for US
District Court judges.164 On average, in a four-year presidential
term, a president appoints about thirty-nine US Court of
Appeals judges and about 152 US District Court judges.165 In
light of these figures, it is likely that conservative judges will still
outnumber liberal judges at the end of President Obama’s first
term. If Obama serves a full eight years, there might well be a
significant ideological shift in the federal judiciary by the end of
his second term. However, given the force of stare decisis, there
would still be a lag time before that ideological change had a
significant impact on overall trends in judicial decisionmaking—especially if the Supreme Court retains its conservative
majority during this period.
In sum, absent new congressional legislation, the federal
judiciary is unlikely to be a significant agent of human rights
reform in the next decade. The non-self-executing declarations
stand as a bar to direct application of human rights treaties.
Courts could employ strategies of silent or indirect treaty
application to promote compliance with human rights treaties,
but most judges are not ideologically predisposed to employ
those types of strategies. Finally, the ideological composition of
162. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of
the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1173
(2010).
163. See id. at 1203–05 (providing judicial ideology scores for 143 federal appellate
judges, including ninety-two who received conservative ratings and fifty who received
liberal ratings).
CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/
164. See
Federal
Judgeships,
U.S.
JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
165. These figures are based on the number of judicial appointments by
Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush between 1977 and 2008. See
Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndJudgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/
uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/apptsbypres.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
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the federal courts changes slowly. Therefore, those who favor
progressive human rights reforms should consider pressing
Congress for legislative solutions.
B. Congress as an Agent of Human Rights Reform
The preceding analysis suggests that state and local
governments, the federal executive, and the federal judiciary—
acting separately or in combination—are unlikely to adopt the
measures needed to achieve satisfactory compliance with the
nation’s human rights treaty obligations. Therefore, to ensure
fulfillment of US treaty commitments, new federal legislation is
necessary to empower individuals to raise claims and defenses
based on human rights treaties, and to empower courts to apply
those treaties on behalf of individuals. Draft legislation along
these lines is included in the Appendix. The proposed
legislation raises three distinct sets of questions: 1) why does the
draft legislation focus on direct judicial enforcement of human
rights treaties, rather than some other mechanism for
promoting compliance?; 2) is it realistic to expect Congress to
enact legislation along these lines?; and 3) if enacted, would the
proposed legislation actually have the intended effect? This
Section briefly addresses these three questions.
To begin, it is noteworthy that the United States, as a party
to the ICCPR, has a treaty obligation:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative . . . authorities, or by any other competent
authority provided for by the legal system of the State . . . ;
[and]
c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted.166

166. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 2, para. 3.
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In short, the ICCPR obligates states to ensure that
individuals have access to a competent tribunal with authority to
decide the merits of individual claims, and to grant remedies to
individuals who are victims of human rights treaty violations.
The ICCPR does not require direct application of human
rights treaties. In theory, the United States could fulfill its treaty
obligations without direct application if US courts applied
human rights treaties indirectly and/or silently. However, for
the reasons discussed above, the combination of silent and
indirect application is unlikely to yield satisfactory compliance in
the near future.167
The treaty does not specifically require judicial
enforcement. In theory, a state could effectuate its obligation to
provide individual remedies by creating a sophisticated
administrative enforcement mechanism. However, in the United
States, state and federal courts already have tremendous
experience adjudicating “human rights” claims against federal,
state, and local government officers. US courts tend to rely on
constitutional and statutory law, rather than treaty law, to resolve
these types of claims, but they clearly have the expertise to
handle claims of this nature. In contrast, there is no existing
administrative tribunal with jurisdiction sufficiently broad to
adjudicate the range of claims that could conceivably be raised
under human rights treaties. Thus, if the United States chooses
to provide a forum for direct application of human rights
treaties, it is much more efficient to channel these claims into
existing judicial institutions, rather than creating a new
administrative tribunal for this purpose. In short, the proposed
legislation focuses on direct judicial enforcement because that is
the most efficient way to fulfill the US treaty obligation to ensure
that individuals have access to a competent tribunal with
authority to decide the merits of individual claims.
Given that the current House of Representatives is heavily
influenced by “Tea Party” Republicans, it is unrealistic to think
that the current Congress would support anything like the draft
legislation in the Appendix. However, legislative majorities
change quickly. Democrats gained fifty-five seats in the House of
Representatives and thirteen seats in the Senate between the
167. See supra notes 157–165 and accompanying text.
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109th and the 111th Congresses.168 Republicans gained sixtythree House seats and six Senate seats between the 111th and
112th Congresses.169 It is impossible to predict how long the
Republican Party will maintain its current majority in the House
of Representatives, but that majority will not last forever. Given
the slow rate of change in the composition of the federal
judiciary,170 Congress is more likely than the courts to make a
significant ideological move in a liberal direction over the next
decade.
Moreover, solid bipartisan majorities have supported
previous “human rights” legislation. When Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,171 a sizeable majority of both
Democrats and Republicans in both the House and the Senate
voted in favor of the legislation.172 Similarly, a significant
majority from both parties in both Houses of Congress
supported the Voting Rights Act of 1965,173 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.174 Thus, one should not assume
168. During the 109th Congress, Democrats held 202 House seats and 44 Senate
seats. In the 111th Congress, Democrats held 257 House seats and 57 Senate seats. See
Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present), OFF. OF THE CLERK, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPS., http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/partyDiv.aspx (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter House Party Divisions]; Party Division in the Senate,
SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
1789–Present,
U.S.
one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Senate Party
Divisions].
169. During the 111th Congress, Republicans held 178 House seats and 41 Senate
seats. In the 112th Congress, Republicans hold 242 House seats and 47 Senate seats. See
House Party Divisions, supra note 168; Senate Party Divisions, supra note 168.
170. See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text.
171. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)).
172. House Democrats voted 152 to 96 in favor of the legislation. House
Republicans voted 138 to 34 in favor. Senate Democrats voted 46 to 21 in favor. Senate
Republicans voted 27 to 6 in favor. See [88th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 8,065 (Feb.
10, 1964) (providing the House of Representatives voting record); [88th Cong.] Cong.
Index 8,129 (June 19, 1964) (providing the Senate voting record).
173. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)). House Democrats voted 217 to 54 in favor of the
legislation. House Republicans voted 111 to 20 in favor. Senate Democrats voted 49 to
17 in favor. Senate Republicans voted 30 to 1 in favor. See [89th Cong.] Cong. Index
(CCH) 9,146 (Aug. 3, 1965) (providing the House of Representatives voting record);
[89th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 9,147–48 (Aug. 4, 1965) (providing the Senate
voting record).
174. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006)). House Democrats voted 248 to 3 in
favor of the legislation. House Republicans voted 155 to 17 in favor. Senate Democrats
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that Republicans would uniformly oppose legislation designed
to promote judicial enforcement of human rights treaties.
Finally, assuming that Congress did enact legislation similar
to the draft statute in the Appendix, one might wonder whether
“conservative” judges would thwart the purpose of the
legislation by adopting narrow interpretations of human rights
treaty provisions. This outcome seems unlikely. To understand
why, it is helpful to divide so-called “conservative” judges into
two groups. A minority of conservative judges may be
ideologically opposed to vigorous judicial application of norms
protecting human dignity, liberty, and equality. However, I
believe that the majority of conservative judges would
enthusiastically support judicial application of such norms,
provided that Congress signals its support for judicial
enforcement by enacting appropriate legislation. In other
words, the conservative ideology of many judges is not a
manifestation of ideological opposition to human rights. Rather,
their conservative orientation reflects an ideological
commitment to a democratic process, wherein Congress takes
the lead in determining the content of the rights to be enforced
by the judiciary. If this assessment is correct, then the fear that
conservative judges would thwart the purpose of the proposed
legislation is unwarranted.175
CONCLUSION
Throughout history, great powers have subordinated law to
power in their conduct of international relations. The United
States claims to be a different kind of great power. As a nation
founded on the rule of law ideal, we claim to be committed to
the rule of law not only in domestic affairs, but also in
international affairs. It is time for the United States to back up
this claim with concrete action. To demonstrate its commitment
to the rule of law in international affairs, the United States
voted 44 to 0 in favor. Senate Republicans voted 32 to 8 in favor. See [101st Cong.]
Cong. Index (CCH) 37,131 (May 22, 1990) (providing the House of Representatives
voting record); [101st Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 23,021 (Sept. 7, 1989) (providing
the Senate voting record).
175. In addition, the treaty interpretation provisions in § 7 of the draft legislation,
as well as the findings in § 1 and the statement of purpose in § 2, help minimize the
risk that judges would thwart the purpose of the legislation.
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should enact federal legislation to facilitate domestic judicial
application of international human rights treaties. Until we are
ready for US courts to apply international human rights norms
as a constraint on federal, state, and local government action,
our ostensible commitment to human rights will be more
rhetorical than real. Conversely, by enacting the recommended
legislation, the United States could become the first great power
in world history that actually subordinates power to law in its
conduct of international relations. Moreover, the proposed
legislation would enhance the United States’ moral authority to
speak on behalf of oppressed people everywhere who are
struggling to realize the aspirations expressed in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
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APPENDIX
Human Rights Treaty Implementation Act of 2011 (Draft Legislation)
Sec. 1: Findings
It is in the foreign policy interests of the United States
to ensure that other countries view us as a leader in the
field of international human rights. Certain actions
undertaken by the United States Government in the
context of the war on terror have tarnished the United
States’ reputation in this regard.

Sec. 2: Purpose
(a) This legislation is designed to enhance the United
States’ reputation as a leader in the field of
international human rights, and to enhance U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT).
(b) This legislation empowers individuals to raise
claims and defenses in state and federal courts under
the ICCPR, CERD and CAT, and authorizes courts to
provide judicial remedies for individuals whose treaty
rights are violated.
(c) This legislation effectively removes the non-selfexecuting declarations attached to the treaties.
However, it does not alter any of the other
reservations, understandings or declarations that the
United States adopted when it ratified those treaties.

Sec. 3: Defenses
(a) In any case where a federal or state government
initiates a criminal proceeding against a person, that
person shall be authorized to invoke the ICCPR, the
CERD or the CAT as a defense in the criminal
prosecution.
(b) A defendant’s right to invoke these treaties shall be
subject to the same procedural limitations— including
procedural default rules—that apply to similar
constitutional and statutory defenses.
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(c) State and federal courts shall be obligated to rule
on the merits of human rights treaty defenses to the
same extent that they would address the merits of a
similar federal constitutional or statutory defense.
(d) This section shall also apply to any civil action
initiated by a state or federal government that involves
a threat of civil sanctions.

Sec. 4: Suits Against Federal Agencies and Officers
A federal agency action that infringes rights protected
under the ICCPR, the CERD or the CAT shall be
deemed a “legal wrong” within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. An
individual harmed by such a legal wrong is authorized
to pursue a claim against the relevant government
agency or officer in accordance with the terms of the
Administrative Procedure Act.

Sec. 5: Suits Against State and Local Officers
(a) The ICCPR, the CERD and the CAT create federal
rights that are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(b) An individual who faces a threat of future harm
posed by a prospective or ongoing violation of the
ICCPR, the CERD, or the CAT committed by a state or
local government officer shall have a right of action for
declaratory and injunctive relief in accordance with 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
(c) An individual who has suffered harm as a result of
a completed violation of the ICCPR, the CERD, or the
CAT shall not have a right of action for money
damages under this section.

Sec. 6: Habeas Corpus
(a) The ICCPR, the CERD and the CAT are “treaties
of the United States” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). The ICCPR, the CERD
and the CAT are “laws of the United States” within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(a) and 2255(f)(2). The
ICCPR, the CERD and the CAT constitute “Federal
law” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The writ of habeas corpus extends to prisoners who
are in custody in violation of those treaties.
(b) 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) is hereby amended by
striking the “or” after the semicolon and adding the
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following clause: “or the claim relies on The Human
Rights Treaty Implementation Act of 2011 and the
prior application was filed before enactment of that
Act; or”
(c) 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) is hereby amended by
changing the period to a semicolon and adding the
following clause: “or a claim that relies on The Human
Rights Treaty Implementation Act of 2011 that could
not have been raised in a prior motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.”
(d) In states where state law precludes a prisoner from
filing more than one habeas petition in state court, but
allows a prisoner to file a second petition if the legal
basis for his claim was previously unavailable, it shall be
understood that this legislation provides a legal basis
for claims under the ICCPR, the CERD and the CAT
that was not available prior to the enactment of this
legislation.

Sec. 7: Treaty Interpretation
(a) In adjudicating cases in which individuals raise
claims or defenses under the ICCPR, the CERD or the
CAT, courts responsible for interpreting the relevant
treaty provisions shall consult documents issued by the
Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the
Committee Against Torture. Such documents shall be
treated as persuasive, but not binding, authority for
the purpose of interpreting the relevant treaties.
(b) Courts shall also consider decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights interpreting
analogous provisions of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Such decisions shall be treated as
persuasive, but not binding, authority for the purpose
of interpreting the relevant treaties.
(c) When interpreting the ICCPR, the CERD, and the
CAT, courts shall be guided by the canon of liberal
interpretation, which holds: “If the treaty admits of two
interpretations, and one is limited, and the other
liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude
private rights; why should not the most liberal
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exposition be adopted?” Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242,
249 (1830).
(d) In any case in which state or federal courts are
called upon to interpret the ICCPR, the CERD or the
CAT, the federal government’s views concerning the
proper interpretation of the treaty shall be entitled to
some deference, except insofar as the government
adopted the particular interpretation in the context of
litigation in which a federal government agency or
officer is a party.

Sec. 8: Enemy Combatants
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to alter the rules
governing enemy combatants that have been
established pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, and the
Military Commissions Act of 2009.
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